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ABSTRACT 
 
   
When managers provide earnings guidance, analysts normally respond 
within a short time frame with their own earnings forecasts. Within this setting, I 
investigate whether financial analysts use publicly available information to adjust 
for predictable error in management guidance and, if so, the explanation for such 
inefficiency. I provide evidence that analysts do not fully adjust for predictable 
guidance error when revising forecasts. The analyst inefficiency is attributed to 
analysts' attempts to advance relationship with the managers, analysts' 
compensation not tie to forecast accuracy, and their forecasting ability. Finally, 
the stock market acts as if it does not fully realize that analysts respond 
inefficiently to the guidance, introducing mispricing. This mispricing is not fully 
corrected upon earnings announcement. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates how financial analysts incorporate management 
earnings guidance into their earnings forecasts. Prior research have alleged that 
analysts and firm managers are engaged in the earnings-guidance game, where 
managers guide analysts’ forecasts in managers’ desired directions. For example, 
Brown and Caylor (2005) show that since the mid-1990s, managers consider 
meeting-or-beating analysts’ expectations the most important earnings target. 
Matsumoto (2002) and Cotter et al. (2006) find that the issuance of guidance 
increases the likelihood of meeting-or-beating analysts’ expectations. Richardson 
et al. (2004) observe that analysts’ forecasts shift from optimism at the start of the 
year to pessimism by the end of the year. The authors attribute this finding as that 
the managers walk down analysts’ forecasts to facilitate subsequent equity 
offering and insider trading.  
The evidence for the earnings-guidance game remains unclear for the 
following reasons. First, there is limited evidence on whether the error in 
guidance is ex ante predictable1. If the error is not predictable, then managers may 
have been producing guidance forthrightly, rather than aggressively gaming the 
system.  Second, there is no direct investigation on whether analysts revise 
forecasts in response to the predictable guidance error. Thus, rather than the 
earnings-guidance game, the changes in macroeconomic or industrial trend after 
                                                 
1
 One notable exception is Atiase et al. (2010). The authors focus on directionally incorrect guidance and find 
that the analysts’ forecast revisions decrease in the predicted probability of this type of guidance. As 
directionally incorrect guidance is only a special case of guidance error, results in Atiase et al. may not be 
generalized to more general case of management guidance.  
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the guidance announcement may be the sole culprit for the findings of meeting-or-
beating analysts’ expectations in Matsumoto (2002) and Cotter et al. (2006) and 
equity offering and insider trading in Richardson et al. (2004). This paper 
attempts to address the above issues to shed more insights into the earnings-
guidance game between analysts and managers.  
Another objective of this paper is to investigate whether stock market 
reaction to management guidance is influenced by how analysts incorporate the 
guidance. The empirical investigation is motivated by the conventional wisdom 
that analysts are viewed as important financial intermediaries who interpret 
corporate disclosures and disseminate independent earnings forecasts. Graham et 
al. (2005) suggests that managers perceive analysts as one of the most important 
groups affecting the market’s behavior. Thus, if guidance is predictably erroneous 
but analysts act as managers’ pawns who only advertise, if not amplify, the 
guidance, would market impound the error into stock prices? If so, when would 
the correction for missing pricing occur?  
 Using a large sample of management earnings guidance announcements 
from First Call’s Company Issued Guidance database ranging from 1996 to 2010, 
I document that the guidance error is ex ante predictable based on a set of 
variables related to prior earnings, prior stock returns, and information uncertainty 
during the guidance announcement. I find that the absolute error in the guidance 
adjusted for predictable error is significantly lower than the absolute error in 
analyst consensus forecast issued during the guidance announcement. In other 
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words, analysts act as if they do not fully understand the information identified in 
my analysis when reacting to the guidance. 
 Based on the estimate of predictable error, I define analyst inefficiency as 
the absolute difference between analyst consensus forecast revision and expected 
levels of revision. I document several explanations for the analyst inefficiency. 
First, analyst inefficiency is associated with analysts’ attempts to advance their 
relationship with the managers. Consistent with prior research, analyst 
inefficiency increases when analysts bend their forecasts in favor of the guidance, 
curry favor with managers by issuing optimistic forecasts, and walk down their 
expectations so that the managers can avoid negative earnings surprise. Second, 
analyst inefficiency occurs when analysts’ compensation incentives are not tied to 
forecast accuracy. These incentives include investment banking activities and 
trading commission. Finally, analyst inefficiency is mitigated by analysts’ 
experience, research resources from their brokerage houses, and their prior 
forecasting performance. 
 In regard to stock market reaction, I find that the stock market in general 
discriminates the value-relevance between the predictable guidance error and the 
guidance news adjusted for such error. However, market reaction during the 
guidance announcement is still positively associated with the predictable guidance 
error. Furthermore, the association between market reaction and the predictable 
guidance error is mainly attributed to analyst inefficiency. This association 
reverses upon earnings announcements. 
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This paper adds to the research on the earnings-guidance game by directly 
investigating the predictable error in the guidance and documenting whether the 
error affects analysts’ forecast revisions and, in turn, the market reaction to the 
guidance. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that market reaction to the guidance 
decrease in predicted error. This paper differs from Rogers and Stocken in two 
aspects: First, Rogers and Stocken predict guidance error using hindsight 
information2; whereas this paper predicts error with the public information 
available upon earnings announcements. Second, Rogers and Stocken limit their 
investigation to the market reaction to the guidance. The emphasis of my paper is 
on the analysts’ roles in the market reaction to the guidance. The results suggest 
that market reacts to the predictable guidance error increases when analysts 
incorporate the error into their forecasts. The mispricing due to analyst 
inefficiency is not fully corrected until earnings announcements. 
The implication for the findings of the analysts’ relationship management 
strategies is important. One might expect that Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. 
FD) mitigates analysts’ need to manage relation with managers so that they have 
private access to managers’ inside information. However, despite the passage of 
this regulation, analysts still spend a significant amount of time privately 
interacting with managers. According to the 2011 Bank of New York Survey of 
investor relations officers, the average chief executive officer spends 20% of his 
or her total time with the investment community with analysts. These meetings 
                                                 
2
 Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that insider trading is useful in predicting guidance error. However, they 
also indicate that insider trading data is only observable after the guidance announcement (P. 1250, footnote 
2). In addition, Rogers and Stocken use cross-sectional regression analysis to estimate predicted error. This 
method is problematic because it incorporates guidance information from hindsight and tends to overestimate 
the predictability of guidance error. 
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occur in person, over the phone, and via e-mail. In addition, Mayew et al. (2009) 
analyzed post-Reg. FD conference call transcripts and find that the probability for 
managers to take analysts’ questions during the call increases in the analysts’ 
favorable view of the firm. This paper contributes to this research by identifying 
additional relationship management strategies that analysts can utilize to advance 
their relationships with the managers. 
Prior research suggests that analysts’ compensation incentives affect 
analysts’ objectivity when revising their forecasts. Feng and McVay (2010) 
document that analyst inefficiency (or in their terminology, overweigh 
management guidance) occurs prior to equity offerings events. They argue and 
find that while analyst inefficiency sacrifice forecast accuracy, analysts appear to 
benefit by subsequently advancing investment banking relationships with the 
covered firms. In addition to investment banking relationship, this paper also 
documents that trading commission incentive explains analyst inefficiency. While 
analysts’ conflicts of interest stemming from investment banking relationships has 
been the sole focus among regulators and academia, recent regulatory changes 
that prohibit linking analysts’ compensation to investment banking activities may 
have magnified the importance of trading incentives for analysts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
background review and hypotheses development; Section 3 describes sample 
selection and research designs; Section 4 reports empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Management Earnings Guidance and Guidance Error 
The management earnings guidance is a form of voluntary public 
corporate disclosures predicting the earnings prior to the expected reporting date. 
The primary motivation for managers to issue guidance is to reduce the 
asymmetry in information between managers and analysts, and current or 
potential investors (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Verrecchia 2001). Lower 
information asymmetry is viewed as desirable because it is associated with higher 
liquidity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) and lower cost of capital (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). 
Presumably the management earnings guidance is accurate given 
managers’ superior insider information and their privy to the book. Prior research, 
however, provides evidence that managers do not efficiently incorporate publicly 
available information into the guidance, rendering the guidance error predictable. 
For instance, McNichols (1989) finds that the guidance contains predictable errors 
in relation to prior stock returns, suggesting that managers fail to fully incorporate 
the information embedded in the past stock prices into their guidance. In addition, 
Atiase et al. (2010) document that the usefulness of current guidance is associated 
with prior guidance accuracy. Gong et al. (2010) find significantly positive serial 
correlation in guidance error for a sample of long-horizon guidance of annual 
earnings. They further document that unintentional information processing, rather 
than managers’ incentives, contributes to the persistence in guidance error.  
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 Guidance error is also attributed to management incentive-related factors 
that motivate managers not to disclosure guidance forthrightly. Richardson et al. 
(2004) conjecture that managers prefer initial optimistic forecasts followed by 
pessimistic forecasts immediately before the earnings announcement. Consistent 
with their conjecture, Soffer et al. (2000) document that managers are more likely 
to release pessimistic short-horizon guidance during earnings preannouncement to 
avoid negative earnings surprise. Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) document 
that managers are more likely to release optimistic long-horizon guidance to 
maintain optimistic firm valuation.  
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) report that managers issue pessimistic 
guidance around stock option award periods to temporarily depress stock prices 
and take advantage of a lower strike price on managers’ option grants. Rogers and 
Stocken (2005) find that insider trading is related to pessimistic guidance. Both 
studies suggest that managers have incentives to time their pessimistic guidance 
to take advantage of a lower stock price. 
 
2.2 Analyst Inefficiency of Incorporating Management Earnings Guidance 
In this paper I analyze whether financial analysts inefficiently incorporate 
management earnings guidance and explore the explanations for such 
inefficiency. By analyst inefficiency, I mean that analysts do not completely filter 
out the predictable error in the guidance when revising their forecasts. Generally, 
analysts are concerned with the accuracy of their forecasts because errors in 
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forecasts can adversely affect reputation, increase employment risk (Michaely and 
Womack 1999; Hong and Kubik 2003), affect rankings among analysts (Stickel 
1992), and call into question whether analysts have fulfilled their fiduciary 
responsibility to investors (Morgan and Stocken 2003). However, there are 
several reasons to believe that analyst inefficiency may occur.  
 First, analyst inefficiency may arise due to analysts’ incentives to maintain 
good relationships with managers. Francis and Philbrick (1993) find Value Line 
analysts issue more optimistic forecasts for stocks rated as SELL than those rated 
as BUY, and interpret this result as suggesting that forecast optimism is greater 
when analysts see a need to curry favor with managers. Ke and Yu (2006) find 
that analysts are more accurate and less likely to be fired when their forecasts are 
optimistic at the beginning of the period and pessimistic at the end of the period. 
They conclude that this evidence supports the management access incentives 
hypothesis, reasoning that the walk-down analysts’ greater success results from 
preferential access to managers. In their experiment study, Libby et al. (2008) 
document analysts’ walk-down pattern is particularly stronger when analysts have 
a good relationship with managers than when their only incentive is to be 
accurate. Given these, I expect that analysts have incentive to tailor their forecasts 
in managers’ desired direction, albeit increase forecast error, so that they can 
advance relationship with managers. 
 Second, analyst inefficiency may also arise due to their compensation 
schemes that are not tied their forecast accuracy. One such compensation scheme 
is the investment banking activities. Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and 
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Womack (1999) and Dechow et al. (2000) find that analysts issue more optimistic 
earnings growth forecasts for firms which have investment banking ties to the 
analysts’ brokerage houses. Feng and McVay (2010) document that analysts 
overweigh the information in the guidance prior to equity offering events. They 
argue and find that while forecast accuracy is sacrificed, analysts appear to benefit 
by subsequently advancing investment banking relationships with the firms. 
Another analysts’ compensation scheme that is not tied to their forecast 
accuracy is the trading commission. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Chen and 
Jiang (2006) document that analysts over-weighting to positive information. The 
authors attribute their results to analyst systematic optimism in response to 
information. Hayes (1998) and Beyer and Guttman (2011) analytically show that 
the analyst systematic optimism in response to information (e.g., managers’ 
guidance) is due to their incentive to generate tradition commission. Specifically, 
if the information is sufficiently favorable/unfavorable such that analysts expect 
marginal investors to sell shares, they overweigh the unfavorable information. As 
the marginal benefit overweighting bad news information is lower due to short-
selling constrains (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)) or investors’ disposition 
to hold losers’ stock too long (e.g., Shefrin and Statman (1985)), the 
overweighting is more likely occurs when the information contains good news. 
 Finally, analyst inefficiency may be explained by their low forecasting 
ability to detect predictable error in the guidance. Mikhail et al. (1997) and 
Clement (1999) use an extensive set of measures (e.g., analysts’ experience, 
research resources from their brokerage houses, and prior forecasting track 
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record) to proxy for analysts’ forecasting ability and find that forecasting ability is 
negatively associated with absolute forecasting error. Mikhail et al. (2003) find 
that analysts under-react to prior earnings information less as their experience 
increases. In line with this research, I expect that analysts’ forecasting ability 
influences their inefficiency to filter out the predictable guidance error when 
reacting to the guidance. 
 The above discussion is formalized into the following hypotheses (in 
alternative form): 
H1a: Analyst inefficiency of incorporating management guidance 
increases due to analysts’ incentive to cultivate relationship 
with the managers  
H1b: Analyst inefficiency of incorporating management guidance 
increases due to analysts’ compensation schemes that are not 
tie to forecast accuracy 
H1c: Analyst inefficiency of incorporating management guidance 
increases due to analysts’ low forecasting ability 
 
2.3 Stock Market Reaction to Management Guidance and Analyst Inefficiency 
In a survey of 401 financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) document 
that managers perceive analysts as one of the most important groups affecting the 
stock market’s behavior. Thus, if analysts do not efficiently filter out the 
predictable error in the guidance, does analyst inefficiency affect the market’s 
reaction the guidance?  
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Prior research provides some support that the market understands the 
factors that are associated with analyst inefficiency. Park and Stice (2000) find 
that the market reacts more strongly to forecast revisions issued by analysts with 
superior forecasting accuracy. Mikhail et al. (2003) find that analysts under-react 
to prior earnings information less as their experience increases. The market 
appears to recognize these performance differences, relying less on a naive 
seasonal random walk forecast when analysts are more experienced. More 
recently, Hugon and Lin (2010) focus on a particular type of guidance – guidance 
that is directionally incorrect – and find that market places a greater discount on 
such guidance than analysts do. Their results suggest either that the market 
possesses more information (e.g., macroeconomic or industrial trends) than 
analysts or that analysts strategically misrepresent information in their forecasts 
that are not price-informative.  
Other research, however, questions the market’s ability to see through 
analyst inefficiency. Clement and Tse (2003) and Bonner et al. (2003) provide 
evidence that the market acts as if analysts’ forecast accuracy is not all that 
matters. For example, their results show that the market reacts more strongly to 
forecasts issued earlier in the year; however, earlier forecasts tend to be less 
accurate. Similarly, Gleason and Lee (2003) find that the market does not make a 
sufficient distinction between analysts who are unambiguously providing new 
information and those who are simply herding toward the consensus. In addition, 
they find that the market pays more attention to analysts who have acquired 
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celebrity status, but is more likely to under-appreciate revisions made by more 
obscure analysts with comparable forecasting abilities.   
The above discussion is formalized into the following hypothesis (in 
alternative form): 
H2: Stock market reaction to management earnings guidance is 
associated with analyst inefficiency of incorporating the 
guidance. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The empirical analyses are based on data gathered from four sources: First 
Call Company Issued Guidance database, I/B/E/S Analyst Forecast database, 
CRSP Daily Stock database, and Compustat. I begin with quarterly management 
guidance reported in the First Call Company Issued Guidance database. I only 
retain guidance announcements with either point or closed-range numeric 
earnings estimates. Next, I merge the guidance sample with the I/B/E/S, CRSP, 
and Compustat databases. Observations without valid database identifier links are 
excluded. I apply several screens to this initial sample and outline their effects in 
Panel A of Table 1. First, I require that each guidance announcement has an 
I/B/E/S actual earnings announcement. Second, each guidance announcement has 
I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts prior to and immediately after the guidance provision 
date. Third, each guidance announcement corresponds to non-missing stock price, 
stock return, and financial data as reported in CRSP and Compustat. The final 
sample consists of 18,378 guidance announcements and 1,835 distinct firms.  
Panel B of Table 1 compares key statistics for the final sample, all firm-
year observations reported in Compustat, and the intersection of First Call-
I/B/E/S-Compustat-CRSP. I make these comparisons to gain insight into the 
effects of sample attrition on the generalization of my results. As can be seen, the 
final sample are characterized by larger firms, firms that generate more sales and 
profit, assume more financial leverage, and have larger market-to-book ratios.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Sample Comparison 
 
 
Panel A. Sample Selection  
 
Sample Selection Criteria Management Guidance 
Distinct 
Firms 
All management guidance for quarterly earnings 
(from the First Call database) announced between 
1993 and 2010. 
50,691 5,797 
Retain: guidance with point and closed range 
numerical estimates of EPS.  47,769 4,952 
Retain: guidance with valid CUSIP-PERMNO-
IBES TICKER links.  46,564 4,606 
Retain: guidance with I/B/E/S actual EPS for 
which the guidance is related. 45,227 4,513 
Retain: guidance with I/B/E/S analyst earnings 
forecast issued within 60-days prior to guidance 
announcement.  
38,554 4,070 
Retain: guidance with I/B/E/S analyst earnings 
forecast issued within the 5-days following the 
guidance announcement.  
33,775 3,542 
Retain: guidance with prior quarterly guidance 
error 20,885 2,058 
Retain: guidance with sufficient data to calculate 
time-series earnings prediction 19,366 1,910 
Retain: guidance with non-missing CRSP 5-day 
abnormal returns around the guidance 
announcement and actual earnings 
announcement.  
18,553 1,835 
Retain: guidance with sufficient data to calculate 
prior guidance characteristics and other financial 
variables.. 
17,483 1,835 
Final Sample  17,483 1,835 
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Panel B. Sample Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3)       
 
Compustat-CRSP 
firm-quarters 
Intersection of Mgt 
Guidance and 
Compustat-CRSP 
firm-quarters 
Final Sample 
after Sample 
Selection    
n = 664,108 n = 84,781 n = 17,483 Satterthwaite t-Statistics (Wilcoxon Z) 
Variable 
Mean Mean Mean (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (1) (3) vs. (2) (Median) (Median) (Median) 
LEV 0.5958 0.7015 0.6083 -17.56 -1.26 8.47 
(0.2325) (0.3937) (0.3293) (64.91) (24.06) (-9.40) 
MTB 2.8604 3.3088 3.2446 -25.86 -12.93 1.97 
(1.8310) (2.5033) (2.5090) (99.85) (50.74) (0.95) 
ROA -0.0296 0.0116 0.0120 -182.74 -111.12 -0.99 
  
(0.0061) (0.0145) (0.0149) (128.19) (64.07) (2.77) 
SALE 3.0135 5.4736 5.7212 -351.71 -215.05 -18.26 
(3.0938) (5.4510) (5.6510) (264.93) (141.08) (16.10) 
SIZE 4.5804 7.0411 7.3445 -367.88 -229.62 -23.24 
(4.4848) (6.9610) (7.2222) (280.80) (151.23) (21.10) 
 
Notes to Table 1:  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample selection criteria. Panel B compares key statistics between firm-years observation reported in Compustat universe, the 
intersection of First Call, I/B/E/S, Compustat, and CRSP, and the final sample. Variables are defined as follows. LEV = Financial Leverage. MTB = Market-to-
Book Ratio. ROA = Return on Assets. SALE = Net Sales. SIZE = Firm Size. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions.  
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Consequently, my results may not be applicable to a more general set of firms 
providing earnings guidance. 
 
3.2 Defining Analyst Inefficiency 
For each guidance announcement, the analyst inefficiency of incorporating 
the guidance is defined as the absolute difference between analyst consensus 
forecast and the guidance estimate adjusted for predictable error in the guidance, 
scaled by price. Formally (subscripts omitted for brevity), 
 

=
	
 


, −  −    ! "#!$%
&'  
 
(1a) 
, where analyst consensus forecasts (,) is the average of I/B/E/S 
analysts’ first earnings forecasts issued within the five days following the 
guidance announcement3. The guidance estimate (	
) is either a point 
estimate or mid-point of a range earnings estimate of First Call management 
guidance. To ensure the analysts’ forecasts and management guidance are on the 
same outstanding share basis, I match non-split-adjusted I/B/E/S analyst forecasts 
with the non-split-adjusted (i.e., original) First Call management guidance. I then 
                                                 
3
 While First Call database also provide analysts’ forecasts, the empirical analysis use only analysts’ forecasts 
provided in I/B/E/S database. This design choice is that, unlike I/B/E/S, First Call does not provide unique 
identifier for individual analysts. The unique analyst identifier is crucial in later analysis in that it allows 
me to identify specific analysts’ attributes. Similar research choice can also be found in Ng et al. (2010) 
and Houston et al. (2010). 
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adjust earnings numbers in the two databases using the shares split factors from 
CRSP database. Finally I scale analyst inefficiency () with stock 
price 60-days prior to the guidance announcement.  
The predictable guidance error is estimated using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression (subscripts omitted for brevity):  
 
, = β + β × , + β × ,
	
 

+ β

×  + β
×  + β ×	+ β ×

 + β
× + β

× 	 
(1b) 
 
To avoid hindsight bias, the parameter estimates in the model are updated at the 
beginning of each month using the past three-year data available in the sample. 
The predictable error in each guidance estimate is calculated by applying the 
current guidance information to the most recent parameter estimates. The models’ 
variables are defined and discussed as follows: 
Guidance Error (,): The guidance error is defined as the guidance 
estimate minus I/B/E/S actual EPS, scaled by price. Thus, a positive (negative) 
value of , indicates that the guidance is erroneously optimistic 
(pessimistic). 
Prior Earnings Information (,	
 and , ): The prior earnings 
information is measured with two variables. The first variable is prior guidance 
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error (,	
), defined as the error in the guidance related to prior quarterly 
earnings, scaled by price. For a firm that has multiple guidance announcements in 
the prior quarter, I use the error in the last guidance. 
 The second variable is guidance error predicted by the time-series model 
(, ), defined as the guidance estimate minus earnings predicted by the 
time-series model, scaled by price. Following Frost (1997) and O'brien (1988), I 
use the following time-series model: 
 
,, =  + 
 × ,,	 
+ × ,,	
 − ,,	 
(1c) 
 
, where ,, denotes quarterly I/B/E/S actual EPS for firm i in quarter Q of 
fiscal year t, and , , and  are estimated parameters. The parameter 
estimates are updated each quarter, using the previous eight quarters’ 
observations. Observations are adjusted for changes in the number of outstanding 
shares.  
Stock Returns Information ( and ): As in Hugon and Lin 
(2010), I use stock returns prior to the guidance announcement to construct two 
indicator variables: upward inconsistent guidance () is defined as an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the guidance estimate is greater than analyst 
consensus forecast prior to the guidance announcement and the firm experiences 
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negative stock returns prior to the announcement; 0 otherwise. Downward 
inconsistent guidance () is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the guidance estimate is lower than analyst consensus forecast prior to the 
guidance announcement and the firm experiences positive stock returns prior to 
the announcement; 0 otherwise. I measure analyst consensus forecast prior to the 
guidance announcement with the average of I/B/E/S analysts’ last forecasts issued 
within the 60-days prior to the announcement. The prior stock returns are 
measured with 60-days CRSP size-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns prior to 
the announcement.  
Mangers’ Incentives ( and ): As suggested in Richardson et 
al. (2004), I include guidance horizon (), defined as the number of days 
between the guidance announcement and the earnings announcement to which 
guidance is related.  
 Kross et al. (2010) posit that once the firm achieves consistent string of 
meeting-or-beating analysts’ expectation (MBE), its manager exert efforts not to 
break it because of the high opportunity cost of doing so. The authors document 
that managers of the firms with an established MBE string are more likely to 
provide pessimistically erroneous guidance than firms with no established MBE 
string. Consistent with Kross et al., I include history of MBE (), 
defined as the fraction of earnings in prior four quarters meets or beat analysts’ 
expectations. 
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I do not include management incentives related to insider trading (e.g., 
Richardson et al. (2004);  Rogers and Stocken (2003)) or option grant (Aboody 
and Kasznik (2000)) because these incentives are can only observed after, but not 
before, guidance announcement. To the extent that these incentives are useful in 
predicting guidance error, excluding these incentives only bias against the 
empirical results.   
Information Uncertainty ( and ): I control for earnings 
volatility and firm size, because these variables have been shown to associate with 
the quality of information environment (e.g., Waymire (1985); Lang and 
Lundholm (1996); Cotter et al. (2006)). Earnings volatility () is 
defined as the natural log of the standard deviation of quarterly I/B/E/S actual 
EPS in the past four quarters prior to current guidance announcement. Firm size 
() is defined as the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of the 
quarter immediately preceding the guidance announcement. 
 
3.3 Testing Hypothesis 1 
H1a, H1b, and H1c state that analyst inefficiency is associated with 
analysts’ incentives and their characteristics. I use the following OLS regression 
model to analyze these associations (subscripts omitted for brevity):  
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
=  + 
 ×  +  × !"+  ×#$%+ 
× "+  × &+  ×  # + 
× '(+  × (!+ ! × )(%+ 

× $$#+ 

 × ( 
(2) 
 
The models’ variables are defined and discussed as follows: 
Relationship Management Strategy ( , !", #$%, and 
 "): Following prior research, I use three variables to measure 
relationship management strategy: bending forecast in favor of the guidance 
( ) is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst consensus 
forecast during the guidance announcement is closer to the guidance estimate, in 
absolute term, than analyst consensus forecast prior the guidance announcement; 
0 otherwise. Curry favor with management (!") is defined as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if analyst consensus forecast during the guidance 
announcement is greater than the guidance estimate and the analyst consensus 
recommendation during the same period is a SELL; 0 otherwise. Walk-down 
strategy (#$%) is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst 
consensus forecast changes from optimistic to pessimistic during guidance 
announcement; 0 otherwise.  
Finally, I expect that the analysts feel less need to please managers when 
they can diversify their risk through increasing the number of firms they cover. I 
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measure the analysts’ diversification ( ") as the natural log of the 
average number of firms the analysts cover during the year.  
Compensation Incentives (& and  #): As in Feng and McVay 
(2010), investment banking opportunity (&) is defined as an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the firm announces equity offering between guidance 
announcement and quarterly earnings announcement to which the guidance is 
related; 0 otherwise. The equity offering announcement data is obtained from 
SDC Platinum database. Following the convention in equity offering studies, the 
equity offering announcement is excluded if the global proceeds are less than 5% 
of market value of the firm’s common equity.  
 As discussed in Section 2.2, analysts’ trading commission incentive is 
likely to be associated with the favorable news in the guidance. I measure the 
favorableness in the guidance with an indicator variable: good news guidance 
( #) is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the guidance 
estimate is greater than analyst consensus forecast prior to the guidance 
announcement; 0 otherwise.  
Forecasting Abilities ('(, (!, and )(%): I measure the 
forecasting abilities among the analysts who revise their forecasts in response to 
guidance announcement. The ability measures include: firm-specific experience 
('() is defined as the natural log of the average firm-specific experience. 
Firm-specific experience is calculated as the number of years an analyst issue 
forecast(s) for the firm’s earnings. Analyst prior forecasting accuracy ((! ) 
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is defined as the fraction of analysts who are more accurate in forecasting 
earnings during the year prior to the guidance announcement. Analysts are 
considered to be more accurate if their average of absolute forecast error is lower 
than 90% of other analysts as reported in I/B/E/S database. Top brokerage 
coverage ()(%) is defined as the fraction of analysts who are 
employed by top brokerage house. Top brokerage house is indentified if the 
number of analysts a brokerage house employs during the year is greater than 
90% of other brokerage houses.  
Forecasting Environment ($$# and  (): Analyst inefficiency is also 
attributed to the information uncertainty. I measure the information uncertainty 
with the following two variables: analyst following ($$#) is defined as the 
number of distinct analysts who issue forecasts for the earnings the guidance is 
related. Forecast dispersion ( () is defined as the standard deviation of analyst 
consensus forecast to the earnings to which the guidance is related.  
 
3.4 Testing Hypothesis 2 
H2 is concerned with whether stock market reaction to management 
guidance is associated with analyst inefficiency. To test this hypothesis, I first sort 
the sample into three portfolios based on the analyst inefficiency. Within each 
portfolio, I then analyze the stock market reaction to the two information 
components in the guidance: the predictable error and adjusted guidance news – 
that is, management guidance news minus predictable error estimated from 
 24 
 
Equation 1b. The OLS regression model is as follows (subscripts omitted for 
brevity):  
 
"#$%&' =  + 
 × ",* +  × − ",* +  
× )+  ×) +  ×  
(3a) 
 () =  + 
 × ",* +  × − ",* +  
× )∗ +  ×)∗ +  × ∗ 
(3b) 
 
, where "#$%&' is the CRSP size-adjusted stock returns cumulated between 
0 to 5 days around the guidance announcement.  () is the CRSP size-
adjusted stock returns cumulated between 0 to 5 days around the earnings 
announcement to which the guidance is related. ",*  is the predictable 
guidance error as discussed in Section 3.2.  is the management guidance 
news, defined as the guidance estimate minus the average of I/B/E/S analysts’ last 
forecasts issued within the 60-days prior to the guidance announcement, scaled by 
price.  
 In addition to predictable guidance error and management guidance news, 
I also control for market beta, market-book ratio, and firm size. Market beta 
() and )∗) is estimated using CRSP market return data within 12-
months prior to guidance announcement and earnings announcement. Market-
book ratio () and )∗) is defined as the ratio of market value of common 
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equity and book value of assets at the end of the quarter immediately preceding 
guidance announcement and during earnings announcement. Firm size ( and 
∗) is defined as the natural log of market value of common equity at the end 
of the quarter immediately preceding guidance announcement and during earnings 
announcement. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used to predict 
guidance error. The primary variable of interest is the error in management 
guidance for quarterly earnings (,). The mean and median of guidance 
error are -0.0007 and -0.0005, suggesting that management guidance is generally 
pessimistic.  
For the guidance error predictors, the mean (median) of prior guidance 
error (,	
) and guidance error predicted by time-series model 
(, ) is -0.0007 and -0.0009 (-0.0005 and -0.00012), respectively. I find 
that the mean of upward and downward inconsistent management guidance 
( and ) are 0.1382 and 0.2875. The mean (median) of 
guidance horizon () is 74 (90) days, consistent with prior research that 
guidance is often released during or immediately after prior quarterly earnings 
announcement. In addition, mean (median) of history of meeting-or-beating 
analysts’ expectations () is 0.80 (0.80). 
 
4.2 Guidance Error Prediction 
Table 4 reports the mean and median of parameter estimates for Equation 
(1b). As discussed in Section 3.2, the parameter estimates are updated at the 
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Table 2 
Descriptive 
 
Variables Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std. Dev. 
Main Variable:      
, -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0128 
1) Prior Earnings Information:      
, -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0184 
,
	
 


 
-0.0009 -0.0045 -0.0012 0.0006 0.0356 
2) Stock Returns Information:      
 0.1382 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3451 
 0.2875 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4526 
3) Managers’ Incentives:       
	 74.836 54.000 90.000 92.000 30.442 

 0. 7981 0.6667 0.8000 1.0000 0.2154 
4) Information Uncertainty:      
 0.1577 0.0013 0.0053 0.0230 3.4126 
	 7.3812 6.2896 7.2378 8.3813 1.5605 
 
Notes to Table 2:  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the later analysis. Variables are defined as follows. , = Guidance Error. , = Prior Guidance 
Error. ,	
 

 = Estimated Guidance Error.  = Upward Inconsistent Guidance.  = Downward Inconsistent Guidance. 	 = Guidance 
Horizon.  
 = History of Meeting-or-Beating Analysts’ Expectations.  = Earnings Volatility. SIZE = Firm Size. See Appendix for detailed 
variable definitions. 
 
  
28 
Table 3 
Correlation Analysis 
 
 , , ,
	
 


 
,    1.00     0.35***    0.23*** 
,    0.28***    1.00    0.07*** 
,
	
 


   0.23***    0.07***    1.00 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 ,   	 
  	 
,    1.00    0.05***   -0.06***  -0.07***   -0.08***    -0.08***    0.02*** 
    0.01*   1.00   -0.25***   -0.01***    0.01**    -0.00    0.00 
   -0.01*   -0.25***    1.00    0.07***    0.00    -0.00    0.05*** 
	   -0.00   0.00    0.05***   1.00    0.08***    -0.00    0.09*** 

 -0.06
***
 0.01** -0.00 0.10*** 1.00    -0.02***    0.13*** 
    0.01    0.00    0.00  -0.06***   -0.08***     1.00    0.08*** 
	   -0.01   0.01    0.05***    0.11***    0.12***    -0.01    1.00 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Notes to Table 3:  
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the later analysis. The lower-left diagonal is the Pearson univariate correlation coefficients; the 
upper-right diagonal is the Spearman rank univariate correlation coefficients. Variables are defined as follows. , = Guidance Error. , = Prior Guidance 
Error. ,	
 

 = Estimated Guidance Error.  = Downward Inconsistent Guidance. 	 = Guidance Horizon. 
 = History of Meeting-or-
Beating Analysts’ Expectations.  = Earnings Volatility. SIZE = Firm Size. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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beginning of each month using prior five-year guidance data available in the 
sample, resulting in 167-month sets of regression results. In general, the guidance 
error prediction model provides a modest explanatory power for guidance bias. 
The mean (median) of R-squares and adjusted R-squares are 32% and 32% (17% 
and 16%), respectively.  
With regard to the association between prior earnings information and 
guidance error, I find that the mean and median of coefficients on , and 
,
	
 


 are positive and significant, suggesting that prior earnings 
information is useful to verify guidance estimate. The mean and median of 
coefficient on  () is positive (negative), suggesting that 
guidance contains optimistic (pessimistic) error when managers disclose good 
(bad) news through guidance but the stock returns suggest otherwise. Overall, the 
above findings are consistent with prior research that managers misrepresent or 
exclude information in prior earnings and stock returns when determining the 
guidance estimates. 
 As for the timing of management guidance, I find that coefficient on 
	 is positive and significant, suggesting that managers disclosure strategy 
shift from overly optimistic to overly pessimistic as the earnings announcement 
gradually becomes eminent. In addition, the coefficient on 
, is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the managers’ of the firms with  
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Table 4 
Regression Results for Guidance Error Prediction Model 
 
 
  Dependent Variable = 
, 
Variable Coef. 
Pred. 
Sign. Mean Median 
Intercept β0  -0.0001*  -0.0000 
  
 
1) Prior Earnings Information:   
, β1 + 0.4793*** 0.3748+++ 
,
	
 


 
β2 + 0.1355*** 0.1237+++ 
2) Stock Returns Information:   
 β3 + 0.0002*** 0.0002+++ 
 β4 - -0.0002*** -0.0002+++ 
3) Managers’ Incentives:   
	 β5 + 0.0002*** 0.0001++ 

 β6 - -0.0004*** -0.0002+++ 
4) Information Uncertainty:   
 β7 +/- 0.0007 0.0007 
	 β8 +/- -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Total Observations   167 167 
Average Observations in a regression 
analysis 
                        
3,039  
                 
4,075  
R2   26% 20% 
adj. R2   26% 20% 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
+
 sign-rank test p < 0.10, +++ sign-rank test p < 0.05, +++ sign-rank test p < 0.01 
 
Notes to Table 4:  
Table 4 reports the mean and median of the coefficient estimates for the guidance error prediction model: 
 
, = β + β × , + β × ,
	
 

+ β

×  + β ×  + β
× 	 + β

× 

 + β × + β × 	 
(1b) 
 
The parameter estimates in the model are updated at the beginning of each month using the past five-year 
data available in the sample. The predictable error in each guidance estimate is calculated by applying the 
current guidance information to the most recent parameter estimates. Variables are defined as follows. 
, = Guidance Error. , = Prior Guidance Error. ,	
 
 = Estimated 
Guidance.  = Upward Inconsistent Guidance.  = Downward Inconsistent Guidance.  


 = History of Meeting-or-Beating Analysts’ Expectations.  = Earnings Volatility. 
SIZE = Firm Size. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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Table 5 
Absolute Forecast Error in Management Guidance, Analyst Forecasts, and Adjusted Management Guidance 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Difference in Absolute Value of 
Forecast Error 
Year N 
Absolute 
Value of 
, 
Absolute 
Value of 
	
, 
Absolute 
Value of 
, − ,  
(4) 
= (2) – (1) 
(5) 
= (3) – (1) 
(6) 
= (3) – (2) 
1996 8 0.3303 0.0700 0.2509 -0.2603 -0.0794  0.1809 
1997 60 0.1679 0.1289 0.2062 -0.0391  0.0383  0.0774*** 
1998 168 0.2263 0.1418 0.1819 -0.0844* -0.0444  0.0400* 
1999 187 0.2315 0.2102 0.2382 -0.0212  0.0067  0.0279 
2000 314 0.2073 0.2225 0.2306   0.0152  0.0233  0.0081 
2001 1240 0.2551 0.2468 0.2451 -0.0083 -0.0099 -0.0017 
2002 1642 0.2374 0.2252 0.2100 -0.0122** -0.0273*** -0.0151** 
2003 1848 0.2408 0.2201 0.1940 -0.0206*** -0.0468*** -0.0261*** 
2004 2101 0.2120 0.1816 0.1710 -0.0304*** -0.0411*** -0.0106*** 
2005 2067 0.2004 0.1757 0.1618 -0.0247*** -0.0386*** -0.0138*** 
2006 2018 0.2265 0.1981 0.1787 -0.0285*** -0.0479*** -0.0194*** 
2007 1749 0.2378 0.2219 0.1909 -0.0158*** -0.0469*** -0.0310*** 
2008 1690 0.3472 0.3289 0.2620 -0.0183*** -0.0852*** -0.0669*** 
2009 1497 0.4360 0.3939 0.2928 -0.0421*** -0.1432*** -0.1011*** 
2010 923 0.3071 0.2751 0.1911 -0.0320*** -0.1160*** -0.0839*** 
ALL 
Years 17,483 0.2607 0.2373 0.2064 -0.0234*** -0.0543*** -0.0309*** 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
32 
 
 
 
 
Notes to Table 5:  
Table 5 reports the average of absolute forecast error in management guidance, analyst forecasts, and adjusted management guidance across all the sample years. Column 
(4) and (5) compare management guidance to analyst forecasts and adjusted management guidance. Negative value indicates a smaller absolute forecast error in analyst 
forecasts and adjusted management guidance. Similarly, Column (6) compares analyst forecasts and adjusted management guidance. Negative value indicates a smaller 
absolute forecast error in adjusted management guidance. Variables are defined as follows. , = Guidance Error. 	
, = Analyst Forecast Error after 
Guidance Announcement. , = Predicted Guidance Error. For ease of exposition, I multiply the above variable by 100. See Appendix for detailed variable 
definitions. 
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established meeting-or-beating analysts’ expectations are more likely to be 
pessimistic.  
Table 5 compares the difference in absolute error in guidance estimate, 
analyst consensus forecast during guidance announcement, and adjusted 
management guidance – that is, guidance estimate minus predictable error from 
Equation (1b). For ease of exposition, I multiply the above variable by 100. 
Column (1), Column (2), and Column (3) report the average of these three 
absolute errors across all sample years. In Column (4) I compare the absolute 
error between guidance estimate and analyst consensus forecast. As can be seen, 
for 10 out of 16 sample years the absolute error in analyst consensus forecast is 
significantly lower than the absolute error in the guidance. Consequently, the 
evidence suggests that analysts attempt to predict guidance error when incorporate 
guidance news into their forecasts.  
However, the evidence also indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for 
the predictable guidance error. Column (6) of Table 5 shows that on average the 
absolute error in adjusted management guidance is significantly lower than the 
absolute error in analyst consensus forecast. The difference in absolute error 
between adjusted management guidance and analyst consensus forecast is more 
pronounced in the later sample period.  
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4.3 Explaining Analyst Inefficiency 
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for the variables used for later 
regression analyses. As discussed in Section 3, analyst inefficiency is 
hypothesized to be associated with analysts’ relationship management, 
compensation incentives, and their abilities. For analysts’ relationship 
management variables, the mean of  is approximately 50%. The high value 
of  may indicate either that the guidance contains useful information for 
analysts or that bending forecast in favor of guidance is a common ritual within 
the analyst community. The mean of  is 21%. In un-tabulated table, I find 
that approximately 38% of guidance announcements in the sample are issued by 
managers of the firms rated as SELL. Combining these two findings, the result 
suggests that analysts exhibit a high tendency of optimism than the managers 
when the firms are poorly rated. In addition, the mean of 	
 is only 2%. The 
low percentage of 	
 is puzzling, given that a majority of guidance 
announcement in the sample is pessimistic and that prior research allege that 
managers have been successful to walk down analysts’ expectations.  
For analysts’ compensation incentives, the mean of  is only 0.6%4,5.  
 
                                                 
4
 The percentage of firms announces equity offering in my sample is significantly lower than the findings in 
prior research, because I only account for firms that announce equity offering between the guidance 
announcement and the earnings announcement to which the guidance is related. 
 
5
 In un-tabulated table, I use two different alternative definitions for . The first alternative define  as an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm announces equity offering within 6 months after guidance 
announcement; 0 otherwise. The second alternative defines as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
announces equity offering within 6 months after earnings announcement to which the guidance is related; 0 
otherwise. Regardless of the variables specification, the subsequent regression result remains unchanged. 
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The mean of 	 is 32%, suggesting that a majority of news in 
guidance is either confirming or bad news. This asymmetry is consistent with 
prior research that managers prefer to disclose bad news promptly, but delay 
release of good news. 
With regard to analysts’ ability measures, the mean of  and 
 are 95% and 1.4709. Compared to analysts who do not revise their 
forecasts during guidance announcement, the revising analysts are more likely 
from prestigious brokerage house and possess greater experienced. The mean of 
 and 	 is 0.0292 and 1.4897, respectively. In un-tabulated test, I find 
that  and 	 in my sample are both greater than the same statistics for 
firms without guidance announcement. These difference are consistent with prior 
research that the decision to release management guidance is attributed to higher 
information uncertainty (Lang and Lundholm 1996) and greater analysts’ demand 
for earnings information (Healy and Palepu 2001; Ajinkya et al. 2005). 
Table 7 reports the regression results for Equation (2)6. Consistent with 
H1a, the coefficients on the three relationship management variables (i.e., 
, , and 	
) are all positive and significant. That is, analyst 
inefficiency increases when analysts bend their forecasts in favor of guidance 
news, when they curry favor with managers by issuing more optimistic forecasts
                                                 
6
 Since the relation between Inefficiency and the explanatory variables is unlikely to be linear, I transform 
Inefficiency within each industry into percentile ranks. The empirical results remain similar without the 
transformation. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive 
 
Variables Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std. Dev. 
1) Analysts’ Relation Management Strategies:      
 0.4983 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
 0.2094 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4069 
	
 0.0240 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1531 
 2.7116 2.6027 2.7081 2.8332 0.2308 
2) Analysts’ Compensation Incentives:      
 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0787 
	 0.3231 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4677 
3) Analysts’ Forecasting Abilities:      
 1.4709 1.0986 1.3863 1.7047 0.3691 

 0.0416 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1870 
 0.9581 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.1784 
4) Forecasting Environment:      
 0.0292 0.0058 0.0141 0.0287 0.1153 
	 1.4897 0.6931 1.6094 2.1972 0.8953 
5) Market Reaction Variables:      

 -0.0020 -0.0528 -0.0003 0.0528 0.1021 

	
 0.0035 -0.0385 0.0026 0.0469 0.0851 
      
 
 
Notes to Table 6:  
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Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the later analysis. Variables are defined as follows.  = Bending Forecast in Favor of 
Management Guidance.  = Curry Favor with Management. 	
 = Walk-down Strategy.  = Analyst Diversification.  = Investment 
Banking Opportunity. 	 = Good News Guidance.  = Analyst Firm Specific Experience. 
 = Analyst Prior Forecasting 
Accuracy.  = Top Brokerage Coverage.  = Forecast Dispersion. 	 = Analyst Following. 
 = Abnormal Stock Return 
during Guidance Announcement. 
	
 = Abnormal Stock Return during Earnings Announcement. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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Table 7 
Explaining Analyst Inefficiency of Incorporating Management Guidance News 
 
   
Dependent Variable =  
Variables Coef. 
Pred. 
Sign. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept β0  0.2511*** 0.2169 0.2868*** 0.2388 0.3146*** 
        
1) Analysts’ Relation Management 
Strategies: 
       
	
 β1 + 0.0331***    0.0314*** 
 β2 + 0.0185***    0.0154*** 
 β3 + 0.0304***    0.0375*** 
	 β4 - -0.0134    -0.0110 
2) Analysts’ Compensation Incentives:        
	 β5 +  0.0138***   0.0142*** 

	 β6 +  0.0025   -0.0028 
3) Analysts’ Forecasting Abilities:        
	 β7 -  -0.0553***   -0.0440*** 
 β8 -  -0.0085   -0.0046 
	 β9 -  -0.0500***   -0.0470*** 
4) Forecasting Environment:        
 β10 +    0.2291*** 0.3108*** 
 β11 -    -0.0170*** -0.0165*** 
Industry Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included Included 
N   17,483 17,483 17,483 17,483 17,483 
R2   0.071 0.061 0.068 0.096 0.121 
adj. R2   0.068 0.058 0.064 0.092 0.118 
*
 p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Notes to Table 7:  
Table 7 reports the regression results for the determinants for analyst inefficiency:  
 
 =  +  ×  +  × +  ×	
+  ×+  ×  +  × 	 +  × + 
× 
+  × +  × 	 +  × 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
The coefficient estimate and test statistics are adjusted for firm-level clustering effects. Variables are defined as follows.  = Analyst Inefficiency 
of Incorporating Guidance News, defined as defined as the absolute difference between analyst consensus forecast and the guidance estimate adjusted for predictable 
error in the guidance, scaled by price.  = Bending Forecast in Favor of Management Guidance.  = Curry Favor with Management. 	
 = Walk-down 
Strategy.  = Analyst Diversification.  = Investment Banking Opportunity. 	 = Good News Guidance.  = Analyst Firm Specific 
Experience. 
 = Analyst Prior Forecasting Accuracy.  = Top Brokerage Coverage.  = Forecast Dispersion. 	 = Analyst Following. 
See Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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for the firm receiving SELL recommendation, and when they walk-down their 
forecasts to help managers achieve earnings expectations.  
Consistent with H1b, I find that the coefficients on  is 
positive and significant, indicating that analysts attempt to increase trading 
commission by strategically increasing their inefficiency of incorporating the 
guidance news in response to the favorableness/un-favorableness of news. 
However,   is insignificantly different from zero. 
 H1c is concerned whether analyst inefficiency is attributed to analysts’ 
ability. As expected, I find that the coefficients on 	
 and  are 
negative and significant. Additionally, I find that the coefficients on  is 
significantly positive and the coefficients on 	 is significantly positive, 
suggesting that analyst inefficiency increases when the information environment 
is more uncertain and when fewer analysts conducting research on the firms’ 
earnings.  
 
4.4 Market Reaction and Analyst Inefficiency 
Panel A in Table 8 reports the market reaction to management guidance 
conditional on analyst inefficiency. Column (1) reports the regression results for 
Equation (3) based on full sample. Column (2) to (4) report the results based on 
sample with low, median, and high analyst inefficiency. In Column (1) I find that 
the coefficients on 	,  and − 	,  are positive and 
significant. The difference between these two coefficients is significant, 
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suggesting that market differentiate the informativeness between these two signals 
in the guidance. Moving from low, median, to high analyst inefficiency 
subsample, I find that the market reaction to 	,  is mainly driven by analyst 
inefficiency.  
Panel B in Table 8 reports the market reaction during earnings 
announcement conditional on analyst inefficiency. Similar to Panel A, Column (1) 
reports the regression results for Equation 3 based on full sample. Column (2) to 
(4) report the results based on sample with low, median, and high analyst 
inefficiency. In contrast to Panel A, In Column (1) I find that the coefficient on 
	,  is negative and significant. Moving from low, median, to high analyst 
inefficiency subsample, I find that the negative association between market 
reaction and 	,  is attributed to analyst inefficiency. 
Taken together, the results in Panel A and B are interpreted as follows. 
The market reaction to management guidance is influenced by analyst 
inefficiency. In other words, market act as if it does not fully see through analyst 
inefficiency. The influence from analyst inefficiency is not fully corrected upon 
earnings announcement to which the guidance is related. 
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Table 8 
Market Reaction to Management Guidance News and Analyst Inefficiency 
 
 
Panel A. Market Reaction during Guidance Announcement 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign. 
Dependent Variable =  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coef. All Sample 
Low  
		
 
Medium  
		
 
High  
		
 
Intercept β0 +/- 0.0139** 0.0344*** 0.0183** 0.0021 
  
     
	
,  β1 +/- 2.4553*** -3.5411 1.5762 2.0912*** 
− 	
,  β2 + 7.8151*** 12.3214*** 11.2449*** 6.4384*** 
       
BETA β3  0.0006 -0.0023 0.0012 0.0022 
MTB β4  -0.0020*** -0.0025*** -0.0018*** -0.0018** 
SIZE β5  -0.0010* -0.0020** -0.0016** -0.0006 
       
Industry Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included 
N   17,483 5,905 5,901 5,891 
R2   0.144 0.156 0.161 0.171 
adj. R2   0.141 0.147 0.152 0.162 
*
 p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Panel B. Market Reaction during Actual Earnings Announcement 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign. 
Dependent Variable =  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coef. All Sample 
Low  
		
 
Medium  
		
 
High  
		
 
Intercept β0 +/- 0.0033 0.1014*** -0.0477 0.0446 
 
 
     
	
,  β1 +/- -0.8655* -2.6608 -0.3267 -3.2418** 
− 	
,  β2 + 1.0510*** 1.4944*** 0.9594*** 0.8517** 
       
BETA* β3  0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 
MTB* β4  -0.0006* -0.0010* -0.0002 -0.0007 
SIZE* β5  -0.0036* -0.0070** -0.0030 -0.0017 
       
Industry Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect   Included Included Included Included 
N   17,483 5,905 5,901 5,891 
R2   0.009 0.018 0.019 0.010 
adj. R2   0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.000 
*
 p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Notes to Table 8:  
Table 8 reports the regression results on the effect of analyst inefficiency on the market reaction to management guidance news:  
 
 = 	 + 
 × , +  × 	
 − , +   ×+  ×	 +  ×  (3a) 
 = 	 + 
 × , +  × 	
 − , +   ×∗ +  ×	∗ +  × ∗ (3b) 
 
 
The coefficient estimate and test statistics are adjusted for firm-level clustering effects. Variables are defined as follows.  = Abnormal Stock Return during 
Guidance Announcement.  = Abnormal Stock Return during Earnings Announcement. ,  = Predicted Guidance Error. 	
 = Management Guidance 
News.  and ∗ = Market Beta, estimated using CRSP market return data within 12-months prior to guidance announcement and earnings announcement. 
	 and 	∗= Market-book ratio at the end of the quarter immediately preceding guidance announcement and during earnings announcement.  and ∗= 
Firm Size at the end of the quarter immediately preceding guidance announcement and during earnings announcement.  = Analyst Inefficiency of 
Incorporating Guidance News. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates how financial analysts incorporate management 
earnings guidance into their earnings forecasts. The paper asks three questions. 
First, does the guidance error ex ante predictable? Second, do financial analysts 
fully filter out the predictable error when reacting to the guidance and, if not, what 
are the explanations for such inefficiency? Third, is market reaction to 
management guidance influenced by analyst inefficiency and, if so, when would 
the mispricing due to analyst inefficiency be fully corrected? 
The empirical results in this paper suggest that guidance error is 
predictable using a set of publicly available information related to prior earnings, 
stock returns, and information uncertainty measures. The analysts do not fully 
filter out the predictable error estimated in this paper. The inefficiency can be 
explained by analysts’ relationship management strategies, their incentives not tie 
to forecast accuracy, and their ability to detect guidance error.  
Finally, the results indicate that market reaction to management guidance 
is associated with predictable error. This association is attributed to analyst 
inefficiency. In other words, market act as if it does not fully see through analyst 
inefficiency and, therefore, impound the error into stock prices. This mispricing 
does not fully corrected upon earnings announcement to which the guidance is 
related. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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Variable Definition 
 Bending Forecast in Favor of Management Guidance, 
defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
consensus analyst forecast during management guidance 
announcement is closer to guidance estimate, in absolute 
term, than consensus analyst forecast prior management 
guidance announcement.  
 Abnormal Stock Return during Earnings Announcement, 
defined as CRSP size-adjusted stock returns cumulated 
between 0 to 5 days around the earnings announcement 
to which the guidance is related. 
	
 Abnormal Stock Return during Guidance 
Announcement, defined as CRSP size-adjusted stock 
returns cumulated between 0 to 5 days around the 
guidance announcement. 
	
	

, Analyst Consensus Forecast during Management 
Guidance Announcement, defined as the average of 
I/B/E/S analysts’ first forecasts issued within the 5-days 
following the guidance announcement. 
	
	

, Analyst Consensus Forecast prior to Management 
Guidance Announcement, defined as the average of 
I/B/E/S analysts’ last forecasts issued within the 60-days 
prior the guidance announcement. 
 Curry Favor with Management, defined as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if analyst consensus forecast during 
the guidance announcement is greater than the guidance 
estimate and the analyst consensus recommendation 
during the same period is a SELL; 0 otherwise. Analyst 
consensus recommendation is calculated as the average 
of I/B/E/S analysts’ first recommendations issued within 
the five days following the guidance announcement. 
 Forecast Dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of 
analyst consensus forecast to the earnings to which the 
guidance is related. Forecast dispersion is assigned with a 
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value of zero if there is only one analyst forecasting the 
earnings. 
 Analyst Diversification, defined as the natural log of the 
average number of firms the analysts cover during the 
year. 
 Earnings Volatility, defined as the natural log of the 
standard deviation of quarterly I/B/E/S actual EPS in the 
past four quarters prior to current guidance 
announcement. 
 Investment Banking Opportunity, defined as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm announces equity 
offering between guidance announcement and quarterly 
earnings announcement to which the guidance is related; 
0 otherwise. The equity offering announcement data is 
obtained from SDC Platinum database. The equity 
offering announcement is excluded if the global proceeds 
are less than 5% of market value of the firm’s common 
equity. 
	, Analyst Forecast Error after Guidance Announcement, 
defined as the average of I/B/E/S analysts’ first forecasts 
issued within the 5-days following the guidance 
announcement minus I/B/E/S actual EPS, scaled by 
price. 
, Guidance Error, defined as guidance estimate minus 
I/B/E/S actual EPS, scaled by price. For the closed-range 
guidance (First Call data item CIGCODEQ equals ("B", 
"G", "H")), I use the mid-point between the upper and 
lower bound estimates as the management guidance 
estimate. 
,  Predicted Guidance Error, defined as the predicted value 
of the guidance error prediction model (Equation 1b). 
, Prior Guidance Error, defined as the error in the guidance 
related to prior quarterly earnings, scaled by price. For a 
firm that has multiple guidance announcements in the 
prior quarter, I use the error in the last guidance. 
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,
 
 
Estimated Guidance Error, defined as the guidance 
estimate minus earnings predicted by the time-series 
model, scaled by price. The time-series model is 
constructed as follows: 
,, =  +  × ,, + 
× ,, − ,, 
, where ,, denotes quarterly I/B/E/S actual EPS 
for firm i in quarter Q of fiscal year t. 
 Analyst Firm Specific Experience, defined as the natural 
log of the average firm-specific experience. Firm-specific 
experience is calculated as the number of years an 
analyst issue forecast(s) for the firm’s earnings. 
 Analyst Following, defined as the number of distinct 
analysts who issue forecasts for the earnings the 
guidance is related. 
 Good News Guidance, defined as an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the guidance estimate is greater than 
analyst consensus forecast prior to the guidance 
announcement; 0 otherwise. 
 	! Guidance Estimate, defined as either a point estimate or 
mid-point of a range earnings estimate of First Call 
management guidance. For the closed-range guidance 
(First Call data item CIGCODEQ equals ("B", "G", 
"H")), I use the mid-point between the upper and lower 
bound estimates as the management guidance estimate. 
"# Guidance Horizon, defined as the number of days 
between guidance announcement and actual earnings 
announcement to which guidance is related. 
 ! Upward Inconsistent Guidance, defined as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the guidance estimate is greater 
than analyst consensus forecast prior to the guidance 
announcement and the firm experiences negative stock 
returns prior to the announcement; 0 otherwise. 
" Downward Inconsistent Guidance, defined as an 
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indicator variable that equals 1 if the guidance estimate is 
lower than analyst consensus forecast prior to the 
guidance announcement and the firm experiences 
positive stock returns prior to the announcement; 0 
otherwise. 
	$$!	!% Analyst Inefficiency of Incorporating Guidance News, 
defined as defined as the absolute difference between 
analyst consensus forecast and the guidance estimate 
adjusted for predictable error in the guidance, scaled by 
price. 
 Financial Leverage, defined as long-term liability 
(Compustat data item LLTQ) scaled by total equity 
(Compustat data item CEQQ) at the end of the quarter 
immediately preceding the guidance announcement. 
& Management Guidance News, defined as the guidance 
estimate minus the average of I/B/E/S analysts’ last 
forecasts issued within the 60-days prior to the guidance 
announcement, scaled by price.  
&' Market-to-Book Ratio, defined as defined as the market 
value of equity (Compustat data item PRCCQ × 
CSHOQ) scaled by book value of equity (Compustat data 
item CEQQ) at the end of the quarter immediately 
preceding the guidance announcement. 
&'∗ Market-to-Book Ratio, defined as defined as the market 
value of equity (Compustat data item PRCCQ × 
CSHOQ) scaled by book value of equity (Compustat data 
item CEQQ) at the earnings announcement date. 
 Analyst Prior Forecasting Accuracy, defined as the 
fraction of analysts who are more accurate in forecasting 
earnings during the year prior to the guidance 
announcement. Analysts are considered to be more 
accurate if their average of absolute forecast error is 
lower than 90% of other analysts as reported in I/B/E/S 
database. 
 Return on Assets, defined as income before extraordinary 
item (Compustat data item IBQ) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat data item ATQ) for the quarter immediately 
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preceding the guidance announcement. 
 Net Sales, defined as the natural log of the net sales 
(Compustat data item SALEQ) for the quarter 
immediately preceding the guidance announcement. 
# Firm Size, defined as the natural log of the market value 
of equity (Compustat data item PRCCQ × CSHOQ) at 
the end of the quarter immediately preceding the 
guidance announcement. 
# Firm Size, defined as the natural log of the market value 
of equity (Compustat data item PRCCQ × CSHOQ) at 
the earnings announcement date. 
'( Top Brokerage Coverage, defined as the fraction of 
analysts who are employed by top brokerage house. Top 
brokerage house is indentified if the number of analysts a 
brokerage house employs during the year is greater than 
90% of other brokerage houses. 
( Walk-down Strategy, defined as an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the analyst consensus forecast changes 
from optimistic to pessimistic during guidance 
announcement; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
